

Secure Microkernels, State Monads and Scalable Refinement

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Abstract. We present a scalable, practical Hoare Logic and refinement calculus for the nondeterministic state monad with exceptions and failure in Isabelle/HOL. The emphasis of this formalisation is on large-scale verification of imperative-style functional programs, rather than expressing monad calculi in full generality. We achieve scalability in two dimensions. The method scales to multiple team members working productively and largely independently on a single proof and also to large programs with large and complex properties.

We report on our experience in applying the techniques in an extensive (100,000 lines of proof) case study—the formal verification of an executable model of the seL4 operating system microkernel.

1 Introduction

This paper touches on three main topics: the verification of a secure operating system microkernel, the state monad as used in Haskell programs, and formal refinement as the verification technique in the correctness proof.

The main motivation for our work is the first of these three. In the larger context, we are aiming to design and fully formally verify the seL4 microkernel down to the level of its ARM11 C implementation. The seL4 microkernel [3,6] is an evolution of the L4 family [15] for secure, embedded devices. As described elsewhere [5], the design of seL4 involved building a binary compatible prototype of the kernel in the programming language Haskell which subsequently was automatically translated into Isabelle/HOL to arrive at a very detailed, executable formal model of the kernel. This operational model is inherently state based, and the corresponding Haskell program makes extensive use of the state monad to express the corresponding state transformations. The model is low level, using data types such as 32 bit wide finite machine words, modelling the heap memory of the eventual C program explicitly as part of its state, and mutating typical pointer data structures such as doubly linked lists on that heap.

Complementing this executable model is a still operational, but more abstract specification of the functional behaviour of seL4. This more abstract model

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uses nondeterminism to leave details unspecified and uses, for instance, abstract functions instead of explicit pointer representations (although it still makes use of *references* on many occasions, to model the user-visible sharing behaviour of particular data structures).

This paper presents the main techniques we used in verifying that the executable model correctly implements its abstract specification. It should be noted explicitly that we did not aim for maximum generality and theoretical depth in either the formalisations or the techniques. Instead, we focused on simplicity, easy applicability, and most importantly scalability of the methods. As a microkernel, seL4 is neither nicely modular, nor does it implement a nicely self contained abstract algorithm. Compared to other verifications, the main challenge was to deal with a highly complex, intermingled set of low-level data structures with high reliance on global invariants exploited in various optimisations. The size of the specifications, with about 3K lines of Isabelle definitions on the abstract and 7K lines on the concrete side, implies a massive proof effort which we aimed to spread over multiple people working concurrently, with as little need for interaction and coordination as possible.

In summary, this paper can be seen as a study on how far you can get with the simplest possible methods. It is our hypothesis that it was precisely this simplicity that enabled us to achieve this large-scale verification.

The contributions of this paper are as follows.

- We formalise the nondeterministic state monad with exceptions and failure. This subsumes the state monad with exceptions that is commonly used in Haskell. The formalisation is a shallow embedding into the logic of Isabelle/HOL.
- We present a Hoare Logic and refinement calculus on the above, both simple yet scalable and practical.
- We report on our experience in applying the above to a binary compatible, executable model of seL4 microkernel translated from Haskell.

The following sections provide detail on each of these in turn.

2 State Monads

A state monad allows a pure functional model of computation with side effects. For result type $'a$ and state type $'s$, the associated monad type (abbreviated $('s, 'a) \textit{state-monad}$) is $'s \Rightarrow 'a \times 's$. That is, a function from previous state to next state together with a computation result. A pure state transformer is typically denoted by the one-valued return type *unit* i.e. $'s \Rightarrow \textit{unit} \times 's$.

All monads define two constructors, here called **return** and **bind**. For the state monad they are defined as follows:

```

return  :: 'a  $\Rightarrow$  ('s, 'a) state-monad
return a  $\equiv$   $\lambda$ s. (a, s)

bind    :: ('s, 'a) state-monad  $\Rightarrow$  ('a  $\Rightarrow$  ('s, 'b) state-monad)  $\Rightarrow$  ('s, 'b) state-monad
bind f g  $\equiv$   $\lambda$ s. let (v, s') = f s in g v s'
```

Note that as Isabelle/HOL is simply typed, it is not possible to straightforwardly define the monad type constructor as in Haskell, defining `return`, `bind` and associated syntax once, and thereby proving results generically about the class of monadic types. The solution that we adopt is to instantiate the class for specific monads and monad constructors, e.g., `return :: 'a ⇒ ('s, 'a) state-monad`.

The constructor `return` simply injects the value a into the monad type, passing the state unchanged, whilst `bind` sequentially composes a computation f , and a computation g (a function from the return type of f). The expression `bind f g` is abbreviated as $f \gg= g$. To allow concise description of longer computations, we define a `do` syntax in a similar fashion to Haskell:

$$\text{do } x \leftarrow f; g \text{ od} \equiv f \gg= g$$

A state monad also defines two additional constructors: `get` and `put`, the primitive state transformers (here `()` is the sole element of type `unit`):

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{get} :: ('s, 's) \text{ state-monad} & \text{put} :: 's \Rightarrow (\text{unit}, 's) \text{ state-monad} \\ \text{get} \equiv \lambda s. (s, s) & \text{put } s \equiv \lambda _. ((), s) \end{array}$$

The constructors of all monads must obey the following three laws, which we have instantiated and proved for each monad instance:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{return } x \gg= f & = f \ x & \text{RETURN_BIND} \\ m \gg= \text{return} & = m & \text{BIND_RETURN} \\ (m \gg= f) \gg= g & = m \gg= (\lambda x. f \ x \gg= g) & \text{BIND_ASSOC} \end{array}$$

The simple state monad is able to model sequential computations with side-effects, but does not provide good notation for non-local flow control (e.g. exceptions). A straightforward way to model try-catch-style exceptions is to instantiate the state monad return type with the sum type $'e + 'a$ (for result type $'a$ and exception type $'e$) in place of the simple result type. Every component in the monad now returns either `Inr a` in case of success, or `Inl e` in case of failure with exception e . To complete the model we require a new `bind` constructor, `bindE` which propagates exceptions, and the `catch` constructor to embed the error monad into the non-error state monad.

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{lift } f \ v & \equiv \text{case } v \text{ of Inl } e \Rightarrow \text{return } v \mid \text{Inr } a \Rightarrow f \ a \\ \text{bindE } f \ g & \equiv f \ \gg= \text{lift } g \\ \text{catch } f \ \text{handler} & \equiv \text{do } x \leftarrow f; \\ & \quad \text{case } x \text{ of Inl } e \Rightarrow \text{handler } e \mid \text{Inr } b \Rightarrow \text{return } b \\ & \quad \text{od} \end{array}$$

In formulating an abstract behavioural model, it is convenient to express computation nondeterministically. This is readily modelled as an extension of the state monad by allowing each computation to return a (possibly empty) set of value-state pairs: $'s \Rightarrow ('a \times 's) \text{ set}$, and redefining `bind` as $\lambda s. \bigcup \{g \ a \ s' \mid (a, s') \in f \ s\}$. This formulation has a drawback however: we wish to model catastrophic failure e.g. kernel panic, and show its absence; the obvious definition `fail ≡ λs. {}`, admits only the existential statement: *For all states s, not all paths fail*. What we desire, however, is the universal statement: *For all states s, no path fails*, which cannot be expressed as a simple predicate on the state set, as the

failure case ($\{\}$) is dominated in the union by the non-failure case. Our solution is to append a failure flag which is propagated separately, and which dominates non-failure in `bind`. This leads us to the following definitions (n.b. $f \cdot A$ is the image of A under f):

```

return a ≡ λs. ({(a, s)}, False)
bind f g ≡ λs. (⋃ fst ' (λ(x, y). g x y) ' fst (f s),
               True ∈ snd ' (λ(x, y). g x y) ' fst (f s) ∨ snd (f s))

```

In addition to the state monad constructors `get` and `put`, we define `select`, a nondeterministic `return`, which takes a set of values. We also define `fail` as indicated above:

```

get      :: ('s, 's) nd-monad          put  :: 's ⇒ (unit, 's) nd-monad
get      ≡ λs. ({(s, s)}, False)      put s ≡ λ-. ({((), s)}, False)
select  :: 'a set ⇒ ('s, 'a) nd-monad fail :: ('s, 'a) nd-monad
select A ≡ λs. (A × {s}, False)      fail  ≡ λs. ({}, True)

```

The nondeterminism inherent in the model allows us to model input conveniently: `do x ← select InputActions; f x od`.

3 Hoare Logic on State Monads

The Hoare triple $\{P\} f \{Q\}$ is a predicate on the computation f , stating that if the precondition P holds before execution, then the postcondition Q will hold afterwards. Since HOL is a logic of total functions, and f is just a HOL function that must terminate, our Hoare triples express total correctness. For the nondeterministic state monad, the basic Hoare triple also needs to take into account the return value and is defined as follows:

$$\{P\} f \{Q\} \equiv \forall s. P s \longrightarrow (\forall (r, s') \in \text{fst } (f s). Q r s')$$

Note that the postcondition Q is a binary predicate while P is unary. For the state monad with exceptions, we define:

$$\{P\} f \{Q\}, \{R\} \equiv \{P\} f \{\lambda r s. \text{case } r \text{ of } \text{Inl } a \Rightarrow R a s \mid \text{Inr } b \Rightarrow Q b s\}$$

This specifies a separate postcondition for the exception and non-exception cases. All of the following rules have a natural expression for the state-exception monad in terms of this augmented Hoare triple.

To build a calculus for reasoning about monadic computations, we first state and prove axiomatic rules for the basic constructors:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \{\lambda s. P () x\} \text{put } x \{P\} & \text{PUT-WP} & \{\lambda s. P s s\} \text{get } \{P\} & \text{GET-WP} \\ \{P x\} \text{return } x \{P\} & \text{RETURN-WP} & & \end{array}$$

Constructor `bind` requires a more complicated rule, to capture the interaction of the pre- and post-conditions of composed computations:

$$\frac{\forall x. \{B x\} g x \{C\} \quad \{A\} f \{B\}}{\{A\} f \gg= g \{C\}} \text{SEQ}$$

Note that the premises of the SEQ rule are reversed with respect to the program order, this is done to ease the repeated application of the rule by the VCG.

Finally, to complete the basic calculus we introduce the WEAKEN rule, to substitute arbitrary preconditions. An analogous rule (STRENGTHEN) exists to substitute postconditions.

$$\frac{\{\!|Q|\!\} f \{\!|R|\!\} \quad \forall s. P s \longrightarrow Q s}{\{\!|P|\!\} f \{\!|R|\!\}} \text{WEAKEN}$$

An equivalent set of rules exists to reason about the presence or absence of failure.

4 Verification Condition Generator

As usual in Hoare Logic, reasoning within this calculus can be substantially automated by the use of a verification condition generator (VCG) if we phrase our structural Hoare rules in weakest-precondition (WP) form. The rules given for `put`, `get` and `return` in Sect. 3 are weakest-precondition rules. As an example, consider the following definition of the `modify` constructor, and the proof of its associated weakest-precondition rule:

`modify` $f \equiv \text{do } s \leftarrow \text{get}; \text{put } (f s) \text{ od}$

We wish to show $\{\!|\lambda s. P () (f s)|\!\} \text{modify } f \{\!|P|\!\}$. Before invoking the VCG, we unfold definitions until the goal is phrased in terms of known operations. The VCG then produces the following proof steps automatically.

It starts by applying the WEAKEN rule to replace the concrete precondition with a schematic³ precondition, $?Q$, and an implication. We get two new goals:

1. $\{\!|\lambda s. ?Q|\!\} \text{do } s \leftarrow \text{get}; \text{put } (f s) \{\!|P|\!\}$
2. $\forall s. P () (f s) \longrightarrow ?Q$

The VCG now repeatedly tries to apply one of its set of WP rules. The rule SEQ will match the current goal, as its postcondition is fully general (matching the concrete P) and the precondition, which is concrete in the rule, matches the schematic precondition $?Q$ that we have just created. If the WP set is constructed correctly, the goals will always remain in this form, with concrete postcondition and schematic precondition, and for every top-level operator there will be one rule that matches. In our example, the VCG would apply SEQ, PUT-WP, and GET-WP in turn, leaving the user with only the implication introduced at the first step. This is a HOL formula, free of both monad and Hoare syntax:

1. $\forall s. P () (f s) \longrightarrow P () (f s)$

Here, the goal is trivial, as the precondition we set out to prove was in fact the weakest. We could now add this new WP rule to the set available to the VCG, to avoid having to unfold the definition of `modify` in future. In this manner we progressively build the calculus towards a higher and higher level of abstraction.

³ Schematic variables in Isabelle stand for terms that can be syntactically instantiated (as opposed to free variables that need to remain fixed in proofs).

Note that, if we add rules that are not strictly weakest preconditions, we do not affect the soundness of the VCG, we simply take the risk that the implication goal produced may be too weak to be provable, indicating that our rules need to be strengthened.

The weakest-precondition rules mentioned so far all apply to an arbitrary postcondition. For elementary functions like `put`, `get` and `modify`, rules of this form are easily stated. In principle such a rule can be stated for any of the monadic functions we use. In practice, however, we find that the preconditions in these rules are typically of exponential term size with respect to the complexity of the operator. The tractable solution we have found is to supply the VCG instead with Hoare triples that have specific postconditions and manually simplified preconditions. In principle these can still be weakest precondition rules, however this is not normally the case. An example is `SET-EP-VALID-OBJS`:

$$\{\lambda s. \text{valid-objs } s \wedge \text{valid-ep } v \ s\} \text{ set-endpoint } ep \ v \ \{\lambda rv \ s. \text{valid-objs } s\}$$

The `set-endpoint` function models pointer update for the communication endpoint type. Like other models of pointer update, it simply replaces the contents of the heap at the given address with the new value. The `valid-objs` predicate in the postcondition is one of our global invariants, and establishes that all objects satisfy certain validity criteria. Clearly for `set-endpoint` to preserve `valid-objs` the new endpoint value must satisfy the appropriate validity predicate, `valid-ep`. This is not the weakest possible precondition, as it globally asserts in `valid-objs` that the value about to be replaced is valid, which is unnecessary. The precise weakest precondition would be tedious to define, and the precondition given, although not weakest, is always true in practice.

Hoare triples with specific postconditions complicate the VCG, which must labour to connect the postconditions available to the one that is needed. To illustrate this problem, consider the scenario in which we wish to establish `valid-objs` after a pair of endpoint updates.

$$\begin{array}{l} \{\lambda s. \text{valid-objs } s \wedge \text{valid-ep } v \ s \wedge \text{valid-ep } v' \ s\} \\ \text{do set-endpoint } p \ v; \text{ set-endpoint } p' \ v' \text{ od} \\ \{\lambda rv \ s. \text{valid-objs } s\} \end{array}$$

The VCG can divide the problem using `SEQ` and apply `SET-EP-VALID-OBJS` to the second problem. The postcondition for the first update will then be $\lambda rv \ s. \text{valid-objs } s \wedge \text{valid-ep } v' \ s$. To apply `SET-EP-VALID-OBJS` again, the VCG must first use the conjunction lifting rule.

$$\frac{\{\!P\!\} f \ \{\!Q\!\} \quad \{\!P'\!\} f \ \{\!Q'\!\}}{\{\lambda s. P \ s \wedge P' \ s\} f \ \{\lambda rv \ s. Q \ rv \ s \wedge Q' \ rv \ s\}} \text{ CONJ-LIFT}$$

The conjunction operator is one of a family of first-order logic operators that have a VCG lifting rule. Conjunction, disjunction, and the universal and existential quantifiers have lifting rules, but the negation operator does not. Implication is dealt with by reducing to a disjunction and negation, after which the negation must be dealt with explicitly.

The only such lifting rule that the VCG will use by default is CONJ-LIFT, and it will only be used conservatively, that is, when one of the subproblems created can be immediately solved using another rule. The VCG can also be configured to use any lifting rule aggressively, that is, whenever possible.

The VCG could apply all lifting rules by default. However, should one or more of the created subgoals be unresolvable, the resulting proof state may be difficult to understand or work with. It is thus pragmatically useful for the VCG to fail early, returning an interactive state that is amenable to further manual progress. Conjunction occurs in our postconditions so frequently that the VCG must handle it explicitly, but other operators are rare enough to be handled manually.

The VCG is not limited to Hoare triples. Rules for absence of failure, as mentioned in Sect. 3, can be similarly automated by the same tool.

5 Refinement Calculus

The ultimate objective of our effort is to prove *refinement* [2] between an abstract and a concrete process. We define a process as a triple containing an initialisation function, which creates the process state with reference to some external state, a step function which reacts to an event, transforming the state, and a finalisation function which reconstructs the external state.

record *process* = **Init** :: 'external \Rightarrow 'state set
Step :: 'event \Rightarrow ('state \times 'state) set
Fin :: 'state \Rightarrow 'external

The execution of a process, starting from a initial external state, via a sequence of input reactions results in a *set* of external states: (n.b. $R \text{ `` } S$ is the image of the set S under the relation R)

steps δ *s events* \equiv **foldl** (λ states event. (δ event) `` states) *s events*
execution *A s events* \equiv (**Fin** *A*) ' (**steps** (**Step** *A*) (**Init** *A s*) *events*)

Process A is refined by C , if with the same initial state and input events, execution of C yields a subset of the external states yielded by executing A :

$A \sqsubseteq C \equiv \forall s \text{ events. execution } C \text{ s events} \subseteq \text{execution } A \text{ s events}$

Refinement is commonly proven by establishing forward simulation [2], of which it is a consequence. To demonstrate forward simulation we define a relation, SR , between states of the two processes. We must show that the relation is established by **Init**, is maintained if we advance the systems in parallel, and implies equality of the final external states: (n.b. $S ;; T$ is the composition of relations S and T .)

fw-sim SR C $A \equiv$ ($\forall s. \text{Init } C \text{ s} \subseteq SR \text{ `` Init } A \text{ s}$)
 \wedge ($\forall \text{event. } SR ;; \text{Step } C \text{ event} \subseteq \text{Step } A \text{ event} ;; SR$)
 \wedge ($\forall s s'. (s, s') \in SR \longrightarrow \text{Fin } C \text{ s}' = \text{Fin } A \text{ s}$)

To address our scalability concerns, we wish to decompose the refinement problem into smaller subproblems and translate the statement to the state monad. The simplest way to do this is to break the forward simulation problem down to

component functions. The `corres` predicate captures forward simulation between a single concrete monadic computation, C , and its abstract counterpart, A , with SR instantiated to our standard state relation, `state-relation`. It takes three additional parameters: R relates abstract and concrete return values, and the preconditions P and P' restrict the input states, allowing use of information such as global invariants:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{corres } R P P' A C &\equiv \forall (s, s') \in \text{state-relation}. P s \wedge P' s' \longrightarrow \\ &(\forall (r', t') \in \text{fst } (C s'). \exists (r, t) \in \text{fst } (A s). (t, t') \in \text{state-relation} \wedge R r r') \\ &\wedge (\text{snd } (C s') \longrightarrow \text{snd } (A s)) \end{aligned}$$

Note that the outcome of the monadic computation is a pair of result and failure flag. The last conjunct of the `corres` statement is stronger than strictly necessary for refinement. It states that failure on the concrete m' implies failure on the abstract m . This means we only have to show absence of failure on the most abstract level to get absence of failure on all concrete levels by refinement.

The key property of `corres` is that it decomposes over the `bind` constructor through the `CORRES-SPLIT` rule.

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{CORRES-SPLIT:} \\ \text{corres } R' P P' A C \quad \forall r r'. R' r r' \longrightarrow \text{corres } R (S r) (S' r') (B r) (D r') \\ \quad \quad \quad \{Q\} A \{S\} \quad \{Q'\} C \{S'\} \\ \hline \text{corres } R (P \text{ and } Q) (P' \text{ and } Q') (A \gg= B) (C \gg= D) \end{array}$$

Similar splitting rules exist for other common monadic constructs including `bindE`, `catch` and conditional expressions. There are terminating rules for the elementary monadic functions, for example:

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{CORRES-RETURN:} \\ R a b \\ \hline \text{corres } R (\lambda s. \text{True}) (\lambda s. \text{True}) (\text{return } a) (\text{return } b) \end{array}$$

The `corres` predicate also has a weakening rule, similar to the Hoare Logic.

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{CORRES-PRECOND-WEAKEN:} \\ \text{corres } R Q Q' A C \quad \forall s. P s \longrightarrow Q s \quad \forall s. P' s \longrightarrow Q' s \\ \hline \text{corres } R P P' A C \end{array}$$

Proofs of the `corres` property take a common form: first the definitions of the terms under analysis are unfolded and the `CORRES-PRECOND-WEAKEN` rule is applied. As with the VCG, this allows the syntactic construction of a precondition to suit the proof. The various splitting rules are used to decompose the problem; in some cases with carefully chosen return value relations. Existing results are then used to solve the component `corres` problems. Some of these existing results, such as `CORRES-RETURN`, require compatibility properties on their parameters. These are typically established using information from previous return value relations. The VCG eliminates the Hoare triples, bringing preconditions assumed in `corres` properties at later points back to preconditions on the starting states. Finally, as in Dijkstra's postcondition propagation [4], the precondition used must be proved to be a consequence of the one that was originally assumed.

6 Case Study – The seL4 Microkernel

In this section, we give an overview of the seL4 microkernel, its two formalisations in Isabelle/HOL, some of the properties we have proved on them, and our experience in this verification. With about 10,000 lines of C code; 7,500 lines of executable model and 3,000 lines of abstract Isabelle/HOL specification, the kernel is too large for us to provide any kind of useful detail in a conference paper, or even a comprehensive overview of its formalisation. We do not attempt to do so; instead we provide a very high-level view of its functionality, and show bits and pieces of the formalisation to give an impression of the general flavour.

6.1 Overview

As mentioned in the introduction, seL4 is an evolution of the L4 microkernel family. The main difference to L4 is that it is entirely capability based, unifying all resource accounting and access control into a single mechanism.

All kernel abstractions and system calls are provided via named, first-class kernel objects. Authorised users obtain kernel services by invoking operations on kernel objects. Authority over these objects is conferred via capabilities only. System call arguments can be either data, or other capabilities. Similarly to L4, seL4 provides three basic abstractions: threads, address spaces and inter-process communication (IPC). In addition, seL4 introduces an abstraction, *untyped memory* (UM), which represents a region of currently unused physical memory.

An important part of the seL4 design is that all memory, used directly by an application (e.g. memory frames) or indirectly through the kernel (e.g. page tables), is fully accounted for by capabilities. A *parent* capability to untyped memory can be refined into *child* capabilities to smaller untyped memory blocks or other kernel objects via the *retype* operation. The creator can then delegate all or part of its authority over the object to one or more of its clients. Untyped capabilities can be *revoked*: this removes all corresponding child capabilities from clients and prepares the memory spanned by that capability for retyping.

These mechanisms make seL4 a highly flexible microkernel, supporting a number of practical application scenarios. A simple example is running a full legacy guest OS (e.g. Linux) next to a critical, trusted communications stack; another is to provide full separation between components at multiple security levels with strict controls on explicit information channels between them.

6.2 Formalisation

We now give a very brief introduction to the formalisation of seL4. We begin with the state space of the abstract model.

This state is embedded into a process, modelling machine execution, of which we make only the kernel execution precise. User-level execution is assumed free to mutate any user-accessible part of the state. The transitions for kernel execution are defined by a nondeterministic monadic function, in the manner described above. The events triggering these transitions are: timer interrupts, kernel trap

instructions (user level kernel calls), page faults, and user-level faults. We collect all of these in the data structure *event*, shared with the executable level:

```
datatype syscall = Send | Wait | SendWait | Identify | Yield
datatype event = SyscallEvent syscall | UnknownSyscall nat |
  UserLevelFault nat | TimerInterrupt | VMFaultEvent vptr bool
```

The type *syscall* models user level calls (sending/replying to IPC, identifying capabilities, yielding the current time slice). The other events are machine generated. Arguments to system calls are read from machine registers in binary form and decoded for further processing. This decoding phase is fully precise in the abstract specification, and therefore very similar on the executable and the abstract level. It is a major part of the programmer-visible API specification; in fact, typical kernel reference manuals describe almost exclusively this syntactic part, and only sketch the semantics of the system; the latter is the bulk of the specification in our case.

The abstract state space of seL4 is a record with the following components:

```
record abstract-state = pspace :: obj-ref  $\rightarrow$  kernel-object
  cdt :: cte-ptr  $\rightarrow$  cte-ptr
  cdt-revokable :: cte-ptr  $\Rightarrow$  bool
  cur-thread :: obj-ref
  machine-state :: machine-state

datatype kernel-object = CapTable cap-ref  $\rightarrow$  cap | TCB tcb |
  Endpoint endpoint | AsyncEndpoint async-ep | Frame
```

The whole state space declaration⁴ comprises approximately 200 lines of Isabelle definitions, we mention only the salient points. The *pspace* component models the kernel-accessible part of memory. In this abstract view, it is a partial function from object references (machine words) to kernel objects. The capability derivation tree (CDT) is a data structure that keeps track of the parent/child relationship between capabilities; it is realised as a partial function from child *capability table entry* (CTE) locations to parent CTE locations, i.e., a tree of CTE locations. A CTE location is fully determined by the location of the kernel object (an *obj-ref*) and a position within that kernel object (a *cap-ref*). As mentioned, *CapTable* objects store capabilities; *TCB* objects implement the kernel accounting for threads; *Endpoint* and *AsyncEndpoint* objects implement IPC, and *Frame* objects stand for user data frames. The remaining two components of the global state are a pointer to the TCB of the current thread and the machine state (e.g. register state). Currently, we do not model the machine state in detail, but instead use a set of axiomatised functions such as `loadRegister/storeRegister` on type *machine-state*.

Since the machine context is the main part of the shared outside-observable part of the two models, we have proved during refinement that the observable effect of reads, writes, cache flushes, TLB flushes, etc. is the same on both

⁴ We present a slightly simpler, earlier version of the model here. The current version also contains interrupt tables and page table data structures.

levels. In the next step of refinement, to C, we plan to eliminate these remaining straightforward axioms and provide a direct model for the machine context.

In the concrete model, our abstract views of the CDT, and kernel object states vanish, and are replaced with much more detailed alternatives. The CDT, for instance, becomes a doubly linked list together with a number of flags for level information, stored in machine words within CTEs. In addition, we gain a number of state components implementing data structures that were not necessary on the abstract level. These are: a table of ready-queues for scheduling (indexed by a priority byte), and a scheduler action which effectively points to the next thread's TCB.

```
record concrete-state = ksPSpace :: pspace
                        ksReadyQueues :: 8 word ⇒ ready-queue
                        ksCurThread :: 32 word
                        ksSchedulerAction :: scheduler-action
                        ksMachineState :: machine-state
```

The *ksPSpace* component corresponds to the C heap, and *ksMachineState* to the machine context, as on the abstract side. The rest are global pointer variables. In this way, the executable model is close to the final implementation.

For refinement, we need to define the process types of the models. The executable model has a single entry point, `callKernelC`, which handles the *event* type defined above. It is natural then to define the `Step` component of the process datatype as the outcome of this nondeterministic monadic operator. Likewise, the `Init` component resets the state to the default `newKernelStateC` and then calls `initKernelC`. The `Fin` component is simply the projection, *ksMachineState*. The abstract process is defined similarly.

The refinement property can then be proven using `corres` properties and Hoare triples. First, we establish that our abstract and concrete global invariant collections, (`invsA` and `invsC`), are invariants of the respective processes.

```
{λs. s = newKernelStateA} initKernelA entry frames offset kFrames {λr. invsA}
{invsA} callKernelA e {λr. invsA}, {λr. invsA}

{λs. s = newKernelStateC} initKernelC entry frames offset kFrames {λr. invsC}
{invsC} callKernelC e {λr. invsC}, {λr. invsC}
```

Secondly, we establish that all elements of the `Init` sets are related.

```
(newKernelStateA, newKernelStateC) ∈ state-relation
corres dc (λs. s = newKernelStateA) (λs. s = newKernelStateC)
  (initKernelA entry frames offset kFrames)
  (initKernelC entry frames offset kFrames)
```

Finally we establish that the main execution steps correspond.

```
corres (intr ⊕ dc) invsA invsC (callKernelA event) (callKernelC event)
```

From these we establish forward simulation, which implies refinement. The statements above are slightly simplified versions of our theorems which involve more preconditions on machine behaviour.

6.3 Properties

We now describe some of the properties and invariants we proved on these two formalisations, in addition to the main refinement theorem that states that the concrete model is a correct implementation of the abstract specification.

One of the first properties proved on both levels was that all system calls terminate. Since HOL is a logic of total functions, this is a necessary condition to formalise the kernel behaviour. The proof for most of the kernel was straightforward; we only had one complex, mutually recursive case that models a nested loop in the C code: the *delete* operation that removes capabilities.

The main invariant of the kernel is simple: *all references in the kernel—be it in capabilities, kernel objects or other data structures—always point to an object of the expected type*. This is a dynamic property as memory can be re-typed at runtime. Despite its simplicity, it is the major driver for almost all other kernel invariants. Exceptions are low-level invariants like *address 0 is never inhabited by any object*, and *objects are always aligned to their size*.

The main validity predicates (including `valid-objs` and `valid-ep` mentioned previously) are liftings of the well-typedness criterion above to the entire heap, thread states, scheduler queues and other state components. An example of a more complex invariant, needed to prove that well-typedness is preserved is: *A kernel object k_1 contains a reference to kernel object k_2 if and only if there exists a (possibly transitive) reference from k_2 back to k_1* . This symmetry condition can be used to conclude that if an object contains no references itself, there will be no dangling references to it in the rest of the kernel. It would therefore be safe to remove such an object once capability references are checked. To avoid inefficient object state checks, we additionally observe: *If an object is live (contains references to other objects), there exists a capability to it*.

Testing for capabilities is much easier, because they are tracked explicitly in the CDT. CDT-related properties include:

Linked List. The doubly-linked list structure is consistent (back/forward pointers are implemented correctly), the lists always terminate in NULL, and the list together with the additional tags correctly implements a tree. This is a basic shape property.

Chunks. If two CTEs point to the same memory location, they have a common ancestor and all entries between them in the CDT point to this same memory location. This ensures various tests in the kernel can be implemented locally.

Cap Ancestry. If an untyped capability c_1 covers a sub-region of another capability c_2 , then c_1 must be a descendant of c_2 according to the CDT.

Object Ancestry. If a capability c_1 points to a kernel object whose memory is covered by an untyped capability c_2 , then c_1 must be a descendant of c_2 .

All of these together ensure that memory can be retyped safely and with minimal local checks; if an untyped capability has no children, then all kernel objects in its region must be non-live (otherwise there would be capabilities to them, which in turn would have to be children of the untyped capability). If the objects are not live and no capabilities to them exist, there is no further reference in the whole system that could be made unsafe by the type change.

This example is the most complex chain of invariants we had to create for a single operation. Other operations, such as IPC and scheduling have their own requirements.

6.4 Experience and Lessons Learned

The total effort for the refinement proof described here was 100,000 lines of Isabelle/HOL and 5 person years. The proof led to over 100 changes in each of the two specifications. The majority of the changes were for ease of proof: slight re-arrangement of code, avoidance of unnecessary optimisations, local tests instead of global assumptions. The majority of actual bugs were typographical and copy & paste errors that slipped through prior testing. Unsurprisingly, there were far more of these simple mistakes on the abstract level than on the executable one. The abstract level was only type checked, never run, since it is not executable. We found on the order of 10 conceptual problems and oversights which would have led to crashes or security exploits—as would have most of the typos. These were mainly missing checks on user input, subtle side effects in the middle of operations, or (rarely) too-strong assumptions on what is invariant during execution. Security attacks became apparent via invariant violations.

We found that the kernel programming team usually knew the invariants precisely and used them for optimisations. In fact, the developers were often able to articulate clearly why a certain property should hold or why a certain test was unnecessary. A number of the security breaches mentioned above were discovered during these discussions with the developers. On the other hand, it was the formal proof that forced us to have this discussion in the first place.

In terms of lessons learned, we confirm the usual observation that the more abstract the easier, and the less assumptions on global state the easier. In this light, it was unsurprising that the low-level CDT and large, concrete initialisation phase of the kernel were unpleasant parts of the proof.

After an initial full proof of refinement was achieved, we found that new features could be added with reasonable effort. This depends on how independent the new feature is from the rest of the system. If it uses its own data structure that is not accessed anywhere else, the effort is largely proportional to the size of the feature. For instance, adding multiple capability arguments to system calls (as opposed to only one) was easy, with about 2 person weeks of effort, although it concerned changes fairly deep in IPC message decoding and transfer. If, on the other hand, the feature is highly intermingled with the rest of the system, a factor of the size of the kernel times the size of the feature is to be expected. We hypothesise that the effort for the whole verification so far was quadratic in the size of the kernel. Since in a microkernel almost every basic feature relies on properties of almost all others (IPC, TCBs, CTEs, CDT are all highly connected), proving preservation of a new invariant on one feature will involve significant work not only on this, but on all other features in the kernel as well. The refinement proof itself remains linear in the size of the kernel. With more modular code, one would expect independent data structures and therefore invariant proofs of a size proportional to the code.

Another observation concerns invariant discovery. We began with a simple invariant that was needed for the refinement proof (well-typedness) and let that drive the invariant discovery process. In hindsight it would, after a short initial phase, probably have been more effective to simply use the strongest invariant that we suspected we could prove. At several points we hoped to get away with a simpler formulation, but were then caught out halfway through the proof by a particular operation after several thousand lines of proof. We then ended up with the complex, precise form anyway. The lesson is: in such a complex system, the simple formulation is unlikely to succeed. Take the precise formulation instead, even if it looks like more work initially. As mentioned above, a good source of invariants is the development team.

In terms of proof engineering and the methods presented in this paper, we believe we have achieved our goal of scalability. Up to four people worked on this proof concurrently and independently without much conflict. We estimate that for code of this size (10K lines of C code) a team of more than five or six persons would need a more serious effort in planning and synchronisation.

Once the framework and invariants are established, and more importantly once the kernel is well understood, the proof is not too hard and should be readily repeatable. We see potential for more automation in the refinement proof, and in exploratory automatic invariant proofs. Simple invariants can often be stated and proved automatically for many functions at a time. This could automatically be tried for a set of basic properties before manual proof starts. We have developed first steps in this direction, but have not made it the focus so far.

In conclusion, code verification at this size and level of detail is entirely feasible with current theorem proving technology.

7 Related Work

Earlier work on OS verification includes PSOS [7] and UCLA Secure Unix [20]. Later, KIT [1] describes verification of process isolation properties down to object code level, but for an idealised kernel far simpler than modern microkernels. The Verisoft project [9] is attempting to verify a whole system stack, including hardware, compiler, applications, and a simplified microkernel VAMOS. The VFiasco [13] project is attempting to verify the Fiasco kernel, another variant of L4 directly on the C++ level. The Coyotos [17] kernel is being designed for verification, but it is unclear how much progress has been made.

The House and Osker kernels [11] (in Haskell) and the Hello kernel [8] (in Standard ML) demonstrated that modern functional languages can be used to develop bare metal implementations of operating systems. In contrast, we see our Haskell implementation of the kernel as a prototype only.

There are other approaches to translating Haskell into Isabelle [10,12,14]. Since none of these approaches were able to parse our code base, we use our own translator; for the work presented here, we need to assume its correctness. In the longer term however, this is unnecessary, because the final theorem will be a

refinement theorem between the abstract Isabelle model and the C program. We have already invested significant effort into modelling C precisely [19].

Our treatment of Hoare Logic on monads is much less general than that of Mossakowski et al. [16]. We do not make assertions part of the program, which in our setting would provide barriers to splitting up the same proof among multiple persons. As mentioned before, we trade generality for simplicity, and for lightweight infrastructure with an emphasis on scalability.

8 Conclusion

We have presented simple, but effective techniques for reasoning about state-based functional programs and for proving formal refinement on them. Although we have not aimed at full generality, we are convinced that the combination of basic monads we used covers a wide range of practical programs in languages such as Haskell and ML. Our case study has shown that it is practical to fully formally verify programs of thousands of lines of code at this level.

The salient point of our Hoare Logic is that it is simple enough to be automated effectively; but despite its simplicity, expressive enough to be easily applicable. Our extension of classic refinement to the nondeterministic state monad is formally largely straightforward, and the calculus presented is not complete. Again, the main point is that it is engineered such that a large-scale proof can be effectively divided up into mostly independent parts. Classical step-wise refinement calculi do not necessarily work well within this paradigm, and often require window reasoning and other complex context tracking [18].

The case study we report on constitutes the formal, fully machine-checked verification of a binary-compatible executable model of seL4. Binary compatible meaning that the corresponding Haskell program, together with a hardware simulator, can execute normal, compiled user-level ARM11 binaries that would run unchanged on bare hardware. This includes low-level hardware feedback: cache flushes, TLB loads, etc. To our knowledge, this is the first such verification of an OS microkernel of this size and complexity.

Although the verification reported on here reaches a level of detail far greater than that usually present when a software system is claimed to be verified, we refrain from calling seL4 itself “fully formally verified” yet. Our goal is to take the verification from the executable model down to the level of C code, compiled and running on hardware.

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